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TRUST v. ARDEN FARMS Co. 
[50 C.2d 217; 324 P.2d 5831 
Bank. 
217 
v. AlWEN FARMS COMPANY 
et Respondents. 
Negligence-Res Ipsa Loquitur-Control of Instrumentality.·-
to invoke the doctrine of res loquitur 
the accident has 
eausing the 
establish that the eondition of the 
instrumentality has not siuce it left defendant's 
[21 Id.-Res Ipsa Loquitur-Breaking of Bottle .. ·The mere break-
ing of a milk bottle in a customer's possession while HaHuuiJ." 
it cannot give rise to an inference that the dairy delivering 
the bottle was negligent in failing to discover the defect. 
[3] !d.-Exercise of Care by Vendors.-A dairy is not responsible 
for defects in milk bottles that eannot be found by a reason-
able, praetica hle inspection. 
[ 4] I d.-Res Ipsa Loquitur-Breaking of Bottle.---ln an aetion 
by a customer against a dairy and a bottle manufacturer 
for injuries sustained by the custmnt:r when a milk bottle 
broke in her hand, the res ipsa loquitur doetrine was not appli· 
cable as to the dairy where the customer failed to pre~ent any 
evidence to neg·ate maltreatment of thP bottle by her or her 
three boys after its delivery three dnys before the aecident, 
tlwre being- evidcnee that she had removed the bottle at least 
once and used some of its eontents during that period, and 
that her husband. and boys had aeccss to the refrigerator. 
[5] Id.-Res Ipsa Loquitur-Breaking of Bottle.·-Tn an aetion by 
a customer against a dairy and a bottle manufacturer for 
injuries sustained by the customer when a milk bottle broke in 
her hand, the res ipsa loquitur doctrine was not applicable as 
to the manufncturPr where there was no evidence that the 
bottle was not mishandled or its condition changed after it 
passPd from the manufadurer's control. 
See Cal.Jur.2d, N egligenee, § 313 et srq.; Am.Jur., 
g·ence, § 300. 
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, ~egligenee, § 332 ct seq.; Am.Jur., Negli-
gence, § 306 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] 1--irglig<'w:r, ~ 13(); ·1, f'>, Tj Negli-
geJH·e, §BH; [:3] Ke~·ligeneP, §;1(); ~290; Food, 
~ 1.1(3); [B] Food, § 8(6); 12] KPgligenre, § 125; [11] Evi· 
dence, ~ 156(B); [13] Evidence, § 453; [14] Evidenee, § -1[)7 [15] 
Trial, § 62. 
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[6] Sales-Breach of Warranty-Evidence.-In an action by a 
customer against a dairy and a bottle manufacturer for in-
juries sustained by the customer when a milk bottle broke in 
her hand, there was no basis for claiming any breach of war-
ranty on the part of the dairy where there was no evidence 
that the bottle was defective when delivered by it to the cus-
tomer. 
[7] Negligence-Res Ipsa Loquitur-Breach of Warranty.-The 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur relates to cases involving negli-
gence and has no application to an alleged breach of warranty. 
[8] Food-Regulation-Milk-Containers.-In an action by a cus-
tomer against a dairy and a bottle manufacturer for injuries 
sustained by the customer when a milk bottle broke in her 
hand, it was not shown that either defendant had breached 
any of the provisions of Agr. Code, § 701, relating to care and 
use of containers, where there was no evidence that the bottle 
was not "sound, smooth and free from rust" as required by the 
code section when delivered by the dairy to the customer's 
porch, the only evidence coming from the customer's expert 
who testified that the bottle had a "thin" area around the top 
but that it did not make the bottle unsafe for the use to which 
the dairy applied it. 
[9] Id.-Evidence.-In an action by a customer against a dairy 
and a bottle manufacturer for injuries sustained by the cus-
tomer when a milk bottle broke in her hand, it was not error 
to exclude evidence that there were other containers for milk, 
where this evidence was immaterial to any issue before the 
court. 
[10] Negligence-Evidence.-In an action by a customer against 
a dairy and a bottle manufacturer for injuries sustained by 
the customer when a milk bottle broke in her hand, it was 
proper to exclude evidence that the dairy had delivered six 
allegedly defective bottles to the customer's home during the 
six months following the accident. 
[11] Evidence-Relevancy-Other Accidents.-Generally, evidence 
of subsequent accidents has no probative tendency to show that 
defendant in a personal injury case might reasonably have 
anticipated the previous accident, and such evidence is inad-
missible. 
[12] Negligence-Evidence.-In an action by a customer against 
a dairy and a bottle manufacturer for injuries sustained by 
the customer when a milk bottle broke in her hand, it was 
proper to exclude expert testimony as to whether the bottle 
was safe and what the standards for milk bottles ought to be 
[11] See Cal.Jur.2d, Evidence, §§ 143-145; Am.Jur., Evidence, 
§ 304. 
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where the bottle had stood the test of several months' use 
and the witness testified that it had no defect that was appar-
ent or could be demonstrated or established and also admitted 
that he had no prior experience with milk bottles or the dairy 
trade; no foundation was laid for testimony from him regard-
ing what the standards of safety for milk bottles were. 
[13] Evidence-Opinion Evidence-Qualifications of Expert Wit-
nesses.-An expert is not qualified as a witness unless it is 
shown that he is familiar with the standards required under 
similar circumstances. 
[14] !d.-Opinion Evidence-Qualifications of Expert Witnesses.-
The trial court's ruling on the sufficiency of qualification of 
an expert will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a 
showing of abuse of discretion. 
[15] Trial-View by Jury.-In an action by a customer against a 
dairy and a bottle manufacturer for injuries sustained by the 
customer when a milk bottle broke in her hand, the trial court 
did not err in denying the customer's request that the jury be 
permitted to inspect the manufacturer's premises, this being a 
matter of discretion for the trial court under Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 610, and there being no showing that denial of inspection 
constituted an abuse of discretion. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Edward R. Brand, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action against a dairy and a glass manufacturer for per-
sonal injuries resulting from a milk bottle breaking in cus-
tomer's hand. Judgment of nonsuit affirmed. 
Jerrold A. Fadem for Appellant. 
Belcher, Kearney & Fargo, Louis E. Kearney, Gibson, Dunn 
& Crutcher, Ira C. Powers, Sherman vVclpton, Jr., and Stein-
hart, Goldberg, Feigenbaum & J_jadar for Respondents. 
McCOMB, J.-This is an action for damages for personal 
injuries suffered by plaintiff when a milk bottle she was 
handling in her kitchen broke as she was in the process of 
setting it down on a tile drainboard. 
Defendants are Arden Farms Company, hereinafter called 
"Arden," and Owens-Illinois Glass Company, hereinafter 
called '' Owens. '' 
Owens manufactured a milk bottle which Arden filled with 
skim milk and delivered to plaintiff by placing it on her porch 
220 ARDEN FARMS Co. C.2d 
on a Plaintiff took the milk bottle into 
her home and s1 ored it in a 
On the following the Thursday delivery of the 
bottle of skim milk here involved, plaintiff was in the process 
of setting the bottle, half filled with milk, down on a tile 
drainboard when it broke, and she ;;;ustained cuts about the 
wrist. 
The trial court defendants' motions for a nonsuit. 
Plaintiff appeals from the presenting these ques-
tions: 
First: Was the doctr·ine of res ipsa loq1titur appUcable 
under the facts of this case as to defendant Arden or (b) 
defendant Owens? 
No. [1] A plaintiff seeking to invoke the doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitur against a defendant who at a time prior to the 
accident has relinquished all control of the instrumentality 
causing the injury must affirmatively establish that the con-
dition of the instrumentality has not changed since it left the 
possession of defendant. (Simmons v. Rhodes & Jamieson, 
Ltd., 46 Cal.2d 190, 195 [7] [293 P.2d 26]; Burr v. Sherwin 
Williams Co., 42 Cal.2d 682, 691 [10] [268 P.2d 1041]; 
Escola v. Coca Cola Bottliug Co., 24 Cal.2d 453, 458 [2] [150 
P.2d 436] .) 
The rule is accurately stated by Mr .. Chief Justice Gibson 
in Burr v. Sherwin -williams Co., supra, as follows: ''The 
instructions given, however, were erroneous in that, while they 
purported to state all the conditions under which res ipsa 
loquitur would be applicable, thPy did not inform the jury 
that plaintiffs must show that the instrumentality which 
caused the damage was not mishandled or its condition other-
wise changed after control was relinquished by the person 
against whom the doctrine is to be applied." (Italics added.) 
[2] In Honea v. City Dairy, Inc., 22 Cal.2d 614, 618 [3] 
[140 P.2d 369], this rourt said: "The mere breaking of the 
bottle alone cannot give rise to an inference that defendant 
was negligent in faning to discove1· the defect. [3] \Vhile 
the dairy may have had a duty to make an examination of all 
bottles, whether newly purchased or returned by prior cus-
tomers, it is not responsible for defects that cannot be found 
by a reasonable, practicable inspection. (Citations.) In the 
present case there is no evidence that a feasible means of 
discovering the defect or flaw was available to this defendant. 
The language of the court in Loebig's Guardian v. Coca-Cola 
Bottling Co., 259 Ky. 124 [81 S.W.2d 910], is particularly 
Apr.1958] TRUST v. ARDEN FARMS Co. 
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appropriate. In holding that res loquitur was not appli-
cable to the explosion of a eoca-rola bottle, the court said 
(pp. 911-912): 'The defendant was not, under the circum-
an insurer, and it was not shown that there was any 
more reasonably method of used in the 
than the method of adopted 
the defendant. the bottle u;as defeetive. A con-
elusion of' conld not arise without some showing 
that the def<·et (•ould have hc·en dis(:overrd by the exercise of 
earP .... fn the instant (•m;e Wf' are still left to 
as to the ('anse of the defeet in the bottle and 
its contents or whether it was such a defeet as might have 
been diseovcred by a more thorough inspection. Unless we 
are prepared to hold defendaut as an insurer, it is hard to see 
how else it could be held responsible without some showing that 
its opportunity to exercise carE> was in some measure propor-
tionate to the dnl~' imposed~-~~without some showing that a 
more thorough inspection would have been effective. Plain-
tiff's experts suggest various methods of testing bottles which 
might be applied, hut it is not shown that these tests are 
commercially praeiicable or that they would have disclosed 
the complained-of defect. ... \Ve must measure the duty 
by ordinary standards and by eonsequenees rea,:;;onably to be 
anticipated. Snhjeet to these eritrria, it is clear that the 
proof falls short of rai;;ing any i nfr:'renr:e of negligence.' 
"In L1'cari v. j,Jarkotos, 110 Misc. 334 [180 N.Y.S. 278], 
the court held a bottler not liable for injuries caused by 
breaking of a bottle of a non-explosive cleaning and dyeing 
preparation, saying (p. 280 [N.Y.S.]): 'Nor is there any force 
in respondent's contention, strenuously urged upon this ap-
peal, that the defendant failed in his duty to inspect the 
bottles before filling them; this for the reason that there is no 
proof that any examination or inspection would have found 
the existence of any defert. If sueh had been the ease, it was 
the plaintiff's duty to give evidence thereof. Bruckel v. 
J. Milhau's Son, 116 App. Div. [832] 836 [102 N.Y.S. 395]. 
In the absrnce of such evidence, the learned trial justice had 
no foundation upon which to predicate any finding of negli-
gence on defendallt 's part, and a judgment for plaintiff could 
be based on none other than speculation and pure guess-
work.''' 
[4] (a) vViih reference to Arden, the record discloses that 
on the day the bottle in question, filled with skim milk, had 
been deliverrd to plaintiff's porch, plaintiff had carried the 
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container holding that bottle and other bottles of milk into 
the house, wiped the bottles, and put them in the refrigerator. 
All bottles of milk were stored on one wire shelf in the refrig-
erator, which shelf held eight bottles. The average daily 
delivery of milk to plaintiff's home was fonr bottles. When 
plaintiff had placed the bottles of fresh milk on this shelf, she 
followed her custom of moving the bottles of older milk 
forward on the shelf and storing the bottles of fresh milk 
behind them. To this procedure there was one exception,-
the bottle of skim milk received in the delivery was always 
kept at the front of the shelf. 
The accident occurred on Sunday, March 7, 1954, and 
involved the bottle of skim milk delivered the preceding 
Thursday. Between the time of the delivery of the particular 
bottle of skim milk and the time of the accident, the bottle 
had been removed at least once by plaintiff and some of the 
contents used. Plaintiff had three children, aged 10, 9 and 
5 at the time of the accident, each of whom had access to the 
milk in the refrigerator. The skim milk bottle was identified 
for the children by a band placed around the neck of the 
bottle by plaintiff. 
From the foregoing evidence, it is clear that any of plain-
tiff's three children, having as they did access to the refrig-
erator at all times, may have struck the bottle of skim milk 
with another bottle and damaged it prior to the time of the 
accident, or it may in some other manner or fashion have been 
damaged. 
The children were not called as witnesses to negate mal-
treatment of and damage to the bottle by them prior to the 
time of the accident. Plaintiff's husband, who also had access 
to the refrigerator, was called as a witness, but he made no 
attempt to show that the bottle had not been damaged after 
it had been received and prior to the time of the accident. 
From the foregoing evidence, it is clear that the above 
stated rule was not met in the present case and that there 
is a complete hiatus as to what, if anything, happened to the 
bottle between the time it was placed in the refrigerator by 
plaintiff and the time the injury occurred. Hence, the doc-
trine of res ipsa loquitur was inapplicable to the facts of 
this case. 
[5] (b) With reference to Owens, there is a total absence 
of any evidence that the bottle was not mishandled or its 
condition changed after it.passed from Owens' control. 
Since the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was not applicable 
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and there was a total absence of any evidence of negligence 
upon the part of either defendant, the nonsuit was properly 
granted. 
[6] Second: Was there a breach of warranty upon the part 
of Ardenf1 
No. There was no evidence that the bottle was defective 
when delivered by Arden to plaintiff, and therefore there is no 
basis for claiming any breach of warranty. [7] The doc-
trine of res ipsa loquitur relates to cases involving negligence 
and has no application to an alleged breach of warranty. 
(Oregon Auto-Dispatch v. Portland Cordage Co., 51 Ore. 583 
[95 P. 498, 499]; Poovey v. International Sugar Peed No. 2 
Co., 191 N.C. 722 [133 S.E. 12, 14 [3, 4]]; Btonebrink v. High-
land Motors, 171 Ore. 415 [137 P.2d 986, 990]; cf. Gerber v. 
Faber, 54 Cal.App.2d 674, 686 [4] et seq. [129 P.2d 485] .) 
[8] Third: Was there any evidence that defendants, or 
either of them, breached any of the provisions of section 701 
of the Agricultural Codet2 
No. There was no evidence that the bottle in question was 
not ''sound, smooth and free from rust'' as required by 
section 701 of the Agricultural Code when delivered by Arden 
to plaintiff's porch. The only evidence on this subject carne 
from plaintiff's expert, who testified that the bottle had a 
'Plaintiff and defendant Owens stipulated that plaintiff had no cause 
of action for a breach of warranty against defendant Owens. 
•section 701 of the Ag1-ieultura1 Code reads: 
"(a) Every restaurant, school, hospital, soda fountain or other place 
where food or drink is served to the public, which sells milk, cream, ice 
cream, ice milk, buttermilk or any combination thereof for consumption 
on the premises, upon emptying the eontainers thereof, which are to be 
returned to the milk distributor or manufacturer, shall cause such con-
tainers, except glass containers, to be rinsed and drained. 
'' (b) All containers of milk, cream or products thereof which are 
delivered to the consumer by any retailer or distributor and which are 
to be returned to such retailer or distributor shall be rinsed and drained 
before they are returned. 
"(e) All containers except single service containers of any kind 
in which milk or any product of milk is kept, stored, transported or 
delivered, shall be sound, smooth, free from rust or open seams and at 
all times kept in a condition which will permit thorough cleansing of 
all surfaces with which the milk or its products come in contact. Con· 
tainers including ice cream cabinets commonly used or intended for the 
reception, storage or delivery of milk, cream or products thereof shall be 
used exclusively for the storage and use of milk and milk products and 
shall not be used for any other purpose. All empty containers delivered 
to any producer, manufacturer, retailer or distributor for the reception 
of milk or any product of milk shall be kept in a clean, sanitary, and 
sterile condition and shall be used for no other purpose.'' 
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"thin" around the top but that did not make such 
bottle unsafe for the nse to which .Arden applied it. 
[9] Fourth: Did the trial court err in 
evidence? 
No. Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in not 
her to introduce evidence: 
That there were other containers for milk such as round 
stippled bottles, cardboard cartons, and others. 
This evidence was clearly immaterial to any issue before 
the court. Although glass is subject to breakage, it has many 
qualities as a food container which no paper container can 
fulfill, e.g., lower porosity, impermeability to odor, transpar-
ency, and cleanliness. 
[10] (b) That Arden had delivered six allegedly defective 
milk bottles to plaintiff's home during the six months follow-
ing the accident. 
This evidence was also properly excluded. [11] It is the 
general rule that evidence of subsequent accidents has no 
probative tendency to show that a defendant might reasonably 
have anticipated the previous accident, and therefore such 
evidence is inadmissible. (McCormick v. Great Western Power 
Co., 214 Cal. 658, 668 [5] [8 P.2d 145, 81 A.L.R. 678].) 
[12] Fifth: Did the t1·ial court unduly limit the examina-
tion of the expert w1:tness, Benson? 
No. Plaintiff contends that the witness should have been 
permitted to testify as to whether the bottle was safe and what 
the standards for milk bottles ought to be. 
This testimony was properly excluded for the reason that 
the bottle had stood the test of at least several months' use 
and the witness testified that the bottle had no defect that 
was apparent or could be demonstrated or established. He 
also admitted that he had had no prior experience with milk 
bottles or the dairy trade. Therefore, no foundation was laid 
for testimony from him regarding what the standards of 
safety for milk bottles were. 
[13, 14] The rule is settled that an expert is not qualified 
as a witness unless it is shown that he is familiar with the 
"The witness testified: 
"The Court: (Interrupting) There isn't any question but what thinner 
glass is more susceptible to breakage than thicker glass, but is it of 
such a degree that it would make the bottle, as a unit, unsafe, or have 
an effect on its safety-have an effect on its safety for the use for 
which it is intended? 
" The Witness: I wouldn't say that, no." 
Apr. TRUST v. ARDEN FARMS Co. 
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standards required under similar circumstances (Huffman v. 
Lindquist, 37 Cal.2d 465, 476 [9] [234 P.2d 34, 29 A.L.R.2d 
485] ) ; also, that the trial court's ruling upon the sufficiency 
of the qualification of an expert will not be disturbed on 
appeal in the absence of a showing of abuse of discretion. 
(Beresford v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Go., 45 Cal.2d 738, 749 [13] 
[290 P.2d 498, 54 A.L.R.2d 910]; Bennett v. Los Angeles 
Tumor Institute, 102 Cal.App.2d 293, 296 [ 4} [227 P.2d 473] ; 
Rudat v. Carithers, 137 CaLApp. 92, 97 [3] [30 P.2d 435].) 
In the present case the evidence did not meet the above 
requirements. 
[15] Sixth: Did the trial court err in denying plaintiff's 
request that the jury be permitted to inspect Owens' premises? 
No. Section 610 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads: 
"When, in the opinion of the Court, it is proper for the jury 
to have a view of the property which is the subject of litiga-
tion, or of the place in which any material fact occurred, it 
may order them to be conducted, in a body, under the charge 
of an officer, to the place, which shall be shown to them by 
some person appointed by the Court for that purpose. 'While 
the jury are thus absent, no person, other than the person 
so appointed, shall speak to them on any subject connected 
with the trial." (Italics added.) 
It is thus evident that the matter of inspection is left to 
the sound discretion of the trial court, and in the absence of 
a showing of abuse of discretion, as in the present case, the 
trlal court's denial of an inspection will not be disturbed on 
appeal. (Nunneley v. Edgar Hotel, 36 Cal.2d 493, 501 [6] 
[225 P.2d 497] ; Lagttna Salada etc. Dist. v. Pacific Dev. Go., 
119 Cal.App.2d 470, 477 [14] [259 P.2d 498].) 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Shenk, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
CARTER, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-! concur in the 
judgment insofar as it sustains the granting of nonsuit as to 
Owens-Illinois Glass Company, but disagree with a similar 
conclusion reached in connection with defendant Arden 
Farms. 
The majority concludes that plaintiff failed to present any 
evidence to negate maltreatment of the bottle by her and her 
family after its delivery, and thus, the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur does not apply. It is also held that there is no 
evidence to support a finding of breach of warranty since no 
50 C.2d-8 
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defect in the bottle had been shown to exist. On the basis 
of the facts as stated in the majority opinion these conclusions 
are warranted. However, it is submitted that there are 
material omissions in the ma;jority '" faetual statement, which, 
when viewed aecording to the rule on nonsuit, renders such 
conelusions erroneous. 
The reeord reveals that plaintiff established the following 
uneontroverted faets. The bottle in question was manufae-
tured by Owens sometime in 1953; part of the manufaeturing 
process required that Arden's name be written on the bottle. 
Shortly thereafter the bottle was sent to Arden and used in 
their business of deliveriJJg milk for the months preceding the 
time of breaking in 1954. At the manufacturing stage bottles 
are subjected to a test for visual defeets, and in addition, 
manufacturer Owens conducts statistical tests for latent de-
fects. 'l'hese statistieal tests eonsist of taking a certain number 
of bottles from the production line and subjecting them to 
thermal-shoek impact tests whieh reveal any latent defects. 
This test is regardl'd as 95-98 per cent effeetive in insuring 
that the remaining bottles not so tested will be free from 
hidden defects. At the bottling level, Arden inspeets new as 
well as returned bottles for visual defects to discover any 
damage that might have occurred in shipping or while in use, 
but no test is maintained to diseover latent defects. 
Plaintiff's expert witness testified that he had examined 
the reconstrueted parts of the broken bottle and that the cause 
of the bottle's breaking was impaet, but that from observing 
the fragmentation pattern of the percussion eone and the 
absence of spalling ( ehipping and shattering) the eon tact 
was extremely mild. He further stated that an analysis of 
the fragmentation pattern led him to the eonelusion that the 
bottle could have only broken because of a defect. His study 
indicated that the defect was at the base of the bottle, but 
it was impossible to determine its precise nature. 
Plaintiff's milk delivery consisted of four quarts of milk, 
induding a quart of skim milk, every other day, which was 
plaeed on a refrigerator shelf having space for eight quarts. 
The quart of skim milk being distinguished from the other 
bottles by a blue rubber hand placed around its neck. 
As to the treatment of the bottle after it was delivered, 
plaintiff testified that she was always careful with the milk 
bottles, and that the skim milk while kept on the same shelf 
as the homogenized milk was apart from it, permitting access 
to the homogenized milk without disturbing the skim milk. 
Apr.1958] TRusT v. ARDEN FARMS Co. 
[50 C.2d 217; 324 P.2d 583] 
227 
Plaintiff also stated that no member of her family, including 
the children, had ever broken any bottles, and that no one 
but herself used the skim mille No objection was made to the 
evidence of past acts of due care. 
The question before this court is whether disregarding con-
flicting evidenee, giving to the plaintiff's evidence all the 
value to which it is legally entitled, and indulging in every 
legitimate inferenee which may be drawn from that evidence, 
the evidenee is of sufficient substantiality to support a verdict 
in favor of plaintiff (see Leonard v. ·watsonville Community 
H osp#al, 47 Cal.2d 509, 514-515 [305 P .2d 36]). 
Reading the evidence presented against the background of 
this rule, it must be concluded that plaintiff has established a 
prima facie case against Arden based upon three possible 
theories : ( 1) negligenee by invoking the doetrine of res ipsa 
loquitur; (2) uegligenee by proof of speeifie aets; and (3) 
breaeh of warranty, rendering the nonsuit improper in this 
regard. Ho~ovever, as to Owens, plaintiff has failed to estab-
lish a prima faeie case based either on the doetrine of res ipsa 
loquitur or speeific acts of negligenee, and sinee plaintiff 
stipulated that no breaeh of warranty aetion existed against 
Owens the granting of the nonsuit in this respeet was proper. 
In eonneetion with the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, it may 
be invoked where (1) defendant had exelusive control of the 
instrumentality eausing the injury, and (2) the aceident is of 
sueh a nature that it ordinarily would not oecur in the 
absenee of negligence of defendant (see Escola v. Coca Cola 
Bottling Co., 24 Cal.2d 453, 457-458 [150 P.2d 436] ). The 
exclusive control requirement is modified to the extent that 
if defendant had eontrol at the time of the alleged negligent 
aet and plaintiff proves that the eondition of the instrumen-
tality causing the injury had not ehanged after it left defend-
ant's possession, then plaintiff may avail himself of the 
doctrine providi11g the other eonclition is satisfied (see Honea 
v. City Dairy, Inc., 22 Cal.2d 614, 617-618 [140 P.2d 369]; 
Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., supra, 458). The extent of 
plaintiff's burden of proving that the condition of the instru-
mentality is unchanged is fully dis(~ussed in Escola v. Coca 
Cola Bottling Co., snpm, 458-459, where it is stated: "It is 
not neeessary, of course, that plaintiff eliminate every remote 
possibility of injury to the bottle after defendant lost control, 
and the requirement is satisfied if there is evidence permitting 
a reasonable inference that it was not aeeessible to extraneous 
harmful forces and that it was earefully handled by plaintiff 
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or any third person who may have moved or touched it. [Cita-
tion.] If such evidence is presented, the question becomes 
one for the trier of fact [citation], and accordingly, the issue 
should be submitted to the jury under proper instruetions." 
(S0e also Zentz v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 39 Cal.2d 436, 
444 [247 P.2d 344].) 
CoHtrary to the majority opinion there is evidence which 
can form the basis of a rea'lonable iuferenee that the condition 
of the bottle had not changed. Plaintiff testified that she 
handled the bottle with due care. This evidence is sufficient 
to satisfy the requirement that the bottle had not ehauged 
insofar as plaintiff's handling is concerned (see Honea v. City 
Dairy, Inc., S1tpra, 618). ·while there is no clireet evidence that 
the bottle was carefully handled by third persons having 
access to it, there is circumstantial evidence on which a 
reasonable inference can be predicated that these persons 
exercised due care in handling the milk bottle, if they handled 
it at all. Plaintiff stated that no one in her family had ever 
broken a bottle. She added that the bottle was not used by 
any other member of her family. Sud1 sole use being guar·an-
teed by the faet the bottle >ms designated by a blue rubber 
band, its purpose known to all members of the household. It 
was further established that while all the milk bottles were 
kept on the same shelf, the skim was kept "apart" from the 
homogenized milk. It may be inferred from the faet that the 
shelf had space for eight bottles, ancl only four were delivered 
every other day, that being ''apart'' was of sufficient degree 
that access to the homogenized milk was possible without 
disturbing the skim milk From the combination of the facts 
that the skim milk was used only by plaintiff, and that no 
member of the family had ever broken a bottle, plus the in-
ference that the skim milk was "apart" permitting access 
to other bottles, a jury could reasonably conclude that the 
third persons did not touch the skim milk or if they did it was 
done with due eare. 
Having met the burden of showing that her conduct and 
her family's action did not in any way deviate from the exer-
cise of due care, which consequently excludes the possibility 
of the aceident being caused by plaintiff or her family, plain-
tiff can now invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur by show-
ing that the manner in which the bottle was broken do.~s not 
ordinarily happen without negligence for which Arden is 
probably responsible. 
The substantive content of this requirement has been vari-
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able, aud it is necessary to review the cases discussing it. As 
a preliminary point all eases agree that bottlers of beverages, 
including dairies, have a duty of care to inspect bottles 
whether newly purchased or returned by prior customers (see 
Honea v. City Dairy, Inc., supra, 618; Bscola v. Coca Cola 
Bottling Co., supra, 460; Oordon v. A.ztec Brewing Co., 33 
Cal.2d 31-t., ill/ j20:l l'.2d :i22J; Zcuf2 v. Coca Cola Hottl£ng 
Co., su.pra, 448). In Honea v. City Dcriry, Inc., supra, it was 
held that the breaking of a milk bottle is alone insuffh·ient 
under the doetrine of res ipsa loquitur to permit the additional 
and ne~essary inference of negligence by defendant, either in 
eausiug the defective condition or in failing to diseovcr it by 
proper inspection. However, in reaching this conclusion a 
rule was suggested that where plaintiti can demonstrate that 
there was a defect and there were reasonable nwans of dis-
eovering the defect in the exercise of due care, then this 
constitutes sufficient evidence from which to infer that it is 
more probable than not defendant was negligent in failing 
to discover the defeet. This suggested rule was adopted in 
Escola v. Coca, Cola Bott/iug Co., supra, 438, all(l again in 
Gordon v. Aztec Brewing Co., supm. In the Escola ease this 
eourt permitted the applieation of the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur after plaintiff had established that no unreasonable 
extraneous foree had aeted upon the bottle subsequent to 
delivery, and upon the ground there was an inferenee that 
defendant failed to exercise due care in inspecting the bottle 
since it could be determined from the evidence that the bottle 
had a visual defect that could have been ascertained by a 
reasonable inspection. 'rhe evidence relied upon to ereate 
such an inference dealt with the i11spection methods in the 
industry. Pollowing the Escola ~ase this court was faeed with 
a similar question in Gm·don v. Aztec B1·cw1:ng Co., supra, and 
the Eseola rule was followed. 'ro summarize the law as it 
existed after the Aztec Brewing Company case, plaintiff was 
entitled to invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in cases 
involving bursting or breaking bottles where ( 1) there was 
a showing that no external harmful force touched the bottle 
after leaving defendant's control and (2) where evidence was 
presented that the bottle contained a defeet that could be 
discovered by a practieable and reasonable inspection. 
In Zentz v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., S1tpra, the former re-
quirement was retained while the latter was altered materially. 
The rule this court announced therein stated that plaintiff 
may invoke the res ipsa loquitur doctrine where he introduces 
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evidence sufficient to warrant an inference that the bottle was 
not mistreated subsequent to its delivery by defendant and 
where the accident was of such a nature that it can be said, in 
the light of past experience, that it probably was the result 
of negligence by someone and defendant is probably the per-
son who is responsible (Zentz v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., s1~pra, 
446), The court determined that if plaintiff demonstrated 
that he was not an intervening cause, the happening of the 
exploding bottle gave rise to an inference of negligent con-
duct on the part of the defendant. This ruling leads to the 
conclusion that it is no longer necessary to present evidence 
that the defect could have been discovered by a practicable 
and reasonable inspection before the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur may be invoked. The test now is whether from the 
happening of the accident it is more probable than not that 
defendant was negligent. 
Applying this rule to the case at bar it is clear that an 
inference of negligence arises from the breaking of the bottle. 
Plaintiff has established that no harmful intervening forces 
touched the bottle after it left defendant's control; common 
experience tells us that glass milk bottles, when handled as 
plaintiff did, do not ordinarily break, and since Arden has 
a duty to inspect bottles for visual defects, it is more probable 
that a dangerous bottle was placed on the market by a negli-
gent act of Arden, and it is, therefore, responsible for the 
damage caused. Moreover, in this case we have expert testi-
mony that the bottle broke as a result of a defect, which 
renders the inference that defendant was negligent in either 
wholly failing to inspect the bottle, or in failing to make a 
reasonable inspection all the more probable. This probability 
is further underscored by the principle that the possibility 
of the defect in the bottle being latent and not visually dis-
coverable is regarded as insufficient to prevent the application 
of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (Zentz v. Coca Cola Bot-
tling Co., supra, 449). 
I am unconvinced by the distinction attempted to be drawn 
in the Zentz case between bottles that contain carbonated bev-
erages and bottles that contain milk or noncarbonated bev-
erages (see dissenting opinion, Honea v. City Dairy, Inc., 
supra, 623). The question is not whether the bottle contains 
carbonated or noncarbonated beverages, but whether it is safe 
to use for the purpose designed. If a bottle containing milk 
breaks in a customer's hand, the inference of defendant's 
negligence is no less probable than if a bottle containing a 
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carbonated beverage explodes. In either case the bottle was 
not safe for its proposed use because of some defect from which 
we infer a bottler's negligence in failing to discover it. The 
nature of the beverage adds nothing to this inference. 
In addition, plaintiff's evidence would support a finding 
that Arden failed to reasonably inspect the bottle, violating 
its duty of care. As discussed previously, plaintiff and her 
family did not mistreat the bottle subsequent to its delivery 
by defendant, and what is the corollary, the defect was in 
existence prior to plaintiff's handling. Owens established 
that their inspection for latent defects is 95-98 per cent in-
fallible, which plaintiff's expert substantiated, further stating 
that he found no latent defect in the bottle. 'fhis evidence 
plus the fact that the bottle was in use for several months by 
Arden sustains a reasonable inference that the bottle had no 
latent defects, and the defect that did exist was a visible one. 
From the foregoing it follows that the defect was one that de-
fendant should have discoYered when inspecting the bottles 
and failure to do so constitutes negligent conduct which the 
jury could find proximately caused plaintiff's injury. 
The evidence presented by plaintiff, as indicated above, also 
supports a cause of action predicated on breach of implied 
warranty under section 1735 of the Civil Code. In substance 
section 1735 provides that the seller of goods impliedly war-
rants to the buyer who relies on the seller's skill that the goods 
shall be reasonably fit for the purpose sold or if a sale by 
description the goods are of merchantable quality. Prelimi-
nary to maintaining an action for breach of warranty the 
California cases require privity,* i.e., the buyer can only sue 
his immediate seller (Bnrr v. Sherwin Will1'ams Co., 42 Cal.2d 
682,695-696 [268 P.2d 10±1]), noti<·r (Whitfield v. Jessup, 
31 CaL2d 826, 828 [193 P.2d 1] ), sale (Mix v. Ingersoll 
Candy Co., 6 Cal.2d 674, 676 [59 P.2d 144] ), and a reliance 
on the seller's judgment that the goods are fit for the purpose 
sold ( Civ. Code, § 1735). 
These prerequisites have been satisfied. It is clear plaintiff 
was in privity with Arden, that proper notiee was given and 
that plaintiff relied on Arden's judgment that the bottle was 
*California admits an exception to the privity requirement in cases 
involving foodstuffs where it is held that an implied warranty of fitness 
for human consumption runs from the manufacturer to the ultimate 
consumer regardless of privity of contract. (Klein v. Duchess Sandwich 
Co., Ltd., 14 Cal.2d 272 [93 P.2d 799]; Vaccarezza v. Sanguinetti, 71 Cal. 
App.2d G87, 689 [1G3 P.2d 470].) 
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safe as a container for milk. However, a question does arise 
as to whether there was a sale of the bottle. This has never 
been authoritatively answered in California and there is a 
split among the cases in other jurisdictions that have con-
sidered the question, but the weight of authority is that there 
is a sale of the bottle. In Na1tmann v. Wehlc Brew£ng Co., 127 
Conn. 44 [15 A.2d 181], it was held that the warranty under 
the sales act extends to a returnable beverage container, ruling 
that there had been a sale of the bottle. To the same effect, 
11;fclntyre v. Kansas City Coca Cola Bottling Co. (lVIo.), 85 
F.Supp. 708, 711; Nichols v. Nold, 174 Kan. 613 [258 P.2d 
317]; ivleacl v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 329 Mass. 440 [108 
N.E.2d 757]. In two other states, New Jersey and New York, 
the courts have ruled that in the sale of consumer goods in a 
bottle, the seller warrants the fitness of the container as much 
as the contents on the ground that the container is an essen-
tial part of the transaction, it being immaterial whether the 
bottle is sold with the contents or subject to a refund of de-
posit or return. (Cooper v. Newman, 11 N.Y.S.2d 319; see 
Healey v. Trodd, 124 N.,J.h 64 [11 A.2d 88].) 
The jurisdictions that have denied extending the warranty 
to the container have done so on the grounds either that 
the container was not covered by the act (Poplar v. Hochschild, 
Kahn & Co., 180 lVId. 389 [24 1\ .. 2d 788] ), or that the Uni-
form Sales Act had not been adopted in their jurisdiction 
(Soter v. Griesedieck Western Brewery Co., 200 Okla. 302 
[193 P.2d 575, 4 A.L.R.2d 458] ). In the only California 
case, the court, in dictum, discussed the question in a light 
that docs not speak favorably of extending warranty to the 
container (Gerber v. Faber, 54 Cal.App.2d 674, 687-688 [129 
P.2d 485] ). However, this case is by no means conclusive 
and should not operate to prevent this court from considering 
the problem as an original proposition. 
I am persuaded that the more reasoned rule, supported by 
the realities of the situation is that the warranty extends to 
the milk bottle whether returnable or not, there being a "sale" 
of the milk bottle within the meaning of that word as it is 
used in Civil Code, section 1735, when it is delivered to a 
customer. In fact the buyer had no choice but to aecept the 
bottles delivered by Arden. They were seleeted solrly by the 
seller for the purpose of eontaining milk, and plarrd at the 
buyer's doorstep by Ardrn 's ehoice alone. Since a container 
is necessary for the sale of milk, Arden in any sneh sale must 
provide a container suitable for the purpose and the failure 
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<·ntd,llll<'r \\l>!!l<l r•·JH!c•J· the c;Hl<• of milk as we 
impos~i bl<'. Tlms, tlw dairy's sale 
ilw ('fllllniner as lllH<'h a.~ nw milk. The faet the 
bottle may he retl!l'lH'(l docs uot pren~nt there being a "sale" 
of il. for n·tnruing hoitlc.~ is not mmHlatory upon the cus-
tomer, who llla)' b•ep it in his dis,·rdion, bnt returns it as a 
HHtt!t·r uf t·OIJvcni<'JH'l' to himse.lf and the dairy, whieh in turn 
savc·s !Jim additional expense in purehasing mille 
\Vit h tlH: preliminary reqniremPnts satisfied it is now 
possilJlt~ to tonsicler whether 1he e1·iclen<'l' would support a 
verdiet that there lm;; bct>n a brcadt of implied \\'iUTanty. 
This question inYoln·s aseertaining what it is that A.rden 
impliedly \l'ananis. PlaiJitiff eontnHls the implied warranty 
is that the bottle is fit Jor the pnrposc for whid1 it is snpplit>d, 
llallu"ly as a ('Outainer fot' milk, anc1 that when a defective 
botth· is plaecc1 on thr nwrket there i;; a breaeh of this war-
r·auty, whieh renders Anleu absolutely liable to an immediate 
buyer· withont proof of JJegligeJH·P for any injnry caused by 
the c!ef('('t. 
Normally it i;,; a p(Jlic·y question wht>ther a partitular war-
ranty ;;honld be imposetl, whieh imposition requires the court 
to choose a party who is best suited to bear the burden of 
absolnte liability in order to proted the cormumer who is not 
in a position to do so himself (see coneul'l'ing opiniom, Escola 
Y. Coca Cola Boftlinq Co., supra, 4G2-·464; Gordon v. Aztec 
Bi'Cii'iJI[J Co., supra, 5:30). Portnnatcly in this r:ase we are 
aidt>r1 in our poliey detjsion by a ~tatement of legislative intent 
ll'hieh strongly suggests that the implir'd warranty argued for 
is to be applied. '!'his stateme11t is found in section 701 of 
the .Agrieultnral Code and provides in part: "(c) All con-
tainers cxr·.ept single scrvieP r·ontaiucrs of any kind in which 
milk or any product of milk is kept, ;;tored, transported or 
delivr~rcd, shall bP sound, smooth, free from rnst or open seams 
and at all timPs ln·pt in a r:oll(lition whith will permit thorough 
r·J,'ansing of' all snrfaees ·ll'ith whieh the milk or its products 
r:OltHc in <·on tact .... " This S<'e.tion ercates a duty on the 
part of all suppliPrs of milk procluets to use sound bottles 
and thereby argues powerf1tlly for the proposition that an 
implied 1nurant,v in tbis respect is to be imposed. Certainly 
Reetion 701 permits us to WP1W ourselves from the belief that 
suC'h a warranty is agaiu~t traditional praetiees. Adding to 
the foree of the statute, eases where implied warranties have 
been found to exist, :meh as food cases referred to above, 
and eases involving fitnPss and strength of component parts 
234 ARDEN FAm\rS Co. C.2d 
Austin 'l'miler Equip. Co., 102 
) there seems little or no 
reason for detcrmiuing that such a warnmty does not exist 
in this ease. 'l'o the contrary all authority and reason press 
for the of such a warranty siuee Arden is in 
the better position to know of the quality of the thing dealt 
with and may forestall any injury to its customers, who 
refrain from taking proteetivc care in reliance on 
the seller removing all dangers ot defective bottles. And 
finally as a matter of poliey a warranty should be imposed 
on the grounds that "'I' he cost of an injury and the loss of 
time or health may be an overwhelming misfortune to the 
person injured, and a needless one, for the risk of injury can 
be insured by the manufaeturer and distributed among the 
public as a cost of doing business." (Concurring opinion, 
Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., supm, 462.) Arden can be 
held to impliedly warrant, therefore, that all milk bottles 
will be safe for normal use and free from any unreasonable 
dangerous defects. 
'l'o render Arden liable under the warranty theory plain-
tiff must show that the goods were unreasonably dangerous 
either for the use to which they would ordinarily be put or 
for some special use which was brought to the attention of 
the seller, and that the unreasonably dangerous condition 
existed when the goods left the seller's hands (M1:x v. Inger-
soll Candy Co., supr·a; Silva v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 28 Cal. 
App.2d 649 l83 P.2d 76]). The same evidence used to estab-
lish the theories of negligence also may be applied to demon-
strate that there was a defect, which rendered the ordinary 
use of the bottle dangerous, and that it existed prior to plain-
iff's acquisition. Having introduced evidenee to support the 
essential elements in a breach of warranty action Arden is 
liable regardless of any proof of negligence. 
Turning to the question of the correctness of the nonsuit 
as to Owens we need discuss only the theories of negligence 
in view of the stipulation pertaining to breach of warranty. 
As far as the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is concerned, it 
appears that based upon past experience we cannot say that 
from the breaking of the bottle it is more probable than not 
Owens was negligent. The evidence established that the defect 
was a visible one and not latent, indicating that Owens per-
formed its duty to inspect for latent defects with due care. 
Secondly the bottle was in use for several months after its 
delivery to Arden. The inference from this evidence is that 
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sometime after Arden put it to use 
since and common knowledge tell us that if 
the defeet that existed at the time of the breaking, existed 
when the bottle was Arden, the bottle would have 
been broken in Arden's or by the first several customers 
it. Because it did break the most inference 
is that the bottle left Owens free of defects. 
Nor can the res loquitur doctrine be invoked on the 
ground that plaintiff is in doubt as to which defendant is 
liable. Plaintiff relies on Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal.2d 486 
[154 P.2d 687, 162 A.I.~.R. 1258], and Summers v. Tice, 33 
Cal.2d 80 [199 P.2d 1, 5 A.L.R2d 91], but in those cases 
the application of the doctrine >vas permitted because plain-
tiff was faced with the dilemma of being able to prove a 
negligent act, but unable to prove which of the multiple 
defendants committed the act. In the instant case plaintiff is 
not faced with such dilemma, but is able to show exactly which 
defendant was negligent and what the nature of this negli-
gence was. Under such circumstance plaintiff cannot claim 
multiple defendants justifies invoking the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur. 
As for proving Owens committed specific acts of negligence 
the record is devoid of any evidence which would support 
such a finding. 
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the trial court 
should be affirmed as to defendant Owens, but reversed with 
rPspeet to defendant Arden Farms. 
TRA. YNOR, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-The evidence 
that plaintiff handled the bottle carefully and that the im-
pact causing it to break was only a mild one was sufficient 
to support a finding that it waR defective when Ardens Farms 
delivered it to plaintiff. It is reasonable to inft>r not only that 
this impact occurred when plaintiff placed the bottle on the 
drain board but that it waR no more severe than the normal 
impact attending such placement. Therefore plaintiff's ex-
pert could justifiably conclude that the bottle was defective 
in some way at the time it broke, even though he could not 
determine the nature of the defect from an examination of 
the broken bottle. It could reasonably be inferred that no 
other member of plaintiff's family handled the bottle, since 
she was the only one who nscd skimmed milk and it was her 
custom to identify the bottle of such milk with a rubber band 
and to set it to one side of the milk-bottle tray in the refrig-
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erator. Conceivably others in the could have struck 
the other bottles against that one; but that possibility is 
remote given the evidence that no member of the family had 
ever broken a milk bottlr. Milk bottlPs arr ordinarily stnrdy 
enough to withstand thr impacts of normal usage. 'l'he bottle 
in question was not, and it is therefore reasonablr to ronelude 
that it was defective when delivered to plaintiff. (See Gordon 
v. Aztec Brewing Co., 33 Cal.2d 514. 582 f203 P.2d 522], 
concurring opinion.) 
Although I believe that there is also sufficient evidence 
of the other elements of a cause of action for breach of war-
ranty, I would emphasize that "'l'he remedies of injured con-
sumers ought not to be made to depend upon the intricacies 
of the law of sales." (!1 ettcrer v. Armour & Co., 200 F. 322, 
323; Klein v. Duchess 8and1cich ('o., Ltd .. 14 Cal.2r1 272, 282 
[93 P.2d 799] .) Liability should not be determined mechani-
cally by fortuitous eirrnnu;taneeR. It should not be controlling 
that the injury occurs after rather than before a sale. (Com-
pare l}fead v. Coca Cola Bottli11g Co., 329 Mass. 440 [108 
N.E.2d 757, 7G9] [bottle exploded after it was taken from 
vending machine: warranty J with Lasky v. Economy GTocery 
Stores, 319 Mass. 224 [65 N.E.2d 80;), 307] [bottle exploded 
before customer in srlf-serviee storP earrird it past the check 
stand: no warranty J.) It should 11ot he eontrolling that the 
bottle is sold rathrr than bailed. (See Cooper v. Newman, 11 
N.Y.S.2d 319, 320; GeddliiiiJ v. Marsl1 [1920], 1 K.B. 668, 
672-673.) It should not be eon trolling that the consumer is 
found to be in privity of eontraet with the defendant rather 
than not. (See Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., Lid., 14 Cal. 
2d 272 [93 P.2d 799].) The liability of the manufacturer 
should not turn on whethrr he has "rmJiracted" to assume it 
under fmeh erratic tests that haphazardly afford recovery to 
some and deny it to others. "[P] ublic policy demands that 
responsibility be fixed wherever it will most effeeiively reduce 
the hazards to life and Jwalth inherrnt in defective products 
that reach the market." (E~eola v. Coca Cola Bottlin.IJ Co., 
24 Cal.2d 453, 462 [J 50 P.2d 4361, ronenrriug opinion; see 
2 Harper and ,James, Torts, pp. 1570 et seq.) 
In the Eseola ease, a" in Oordotl Y. Azfr•<o Rr!'ll'iii(J Co., 
33 Cal.2d 514 1203 P.2d 522], the <·omt invoked res ipsa loqui-
tur to affirm jndgnwnts for damagrs rrsulting from c>xplosions 
of beverage hottles. l\fy own <'OIH'11l'l'<'twe in those judgments 
rested on the gronnd that "it should now he recognized that 
a manufaeturer ineurR au absolute liability -when an article 
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that lw has pla<·ed on the mark<•t. knowing that it is to be used 
without in;;pedion. prove:; t.o have a drfe<:t that causes injury 
to human lwings." (24 Cal.2d at 461.) I adhere to that 
view and would therrfon• rrYrrse the judgment of nonsuit 
in favor of ArdPn Farms in this casr. 
Although thifl eonrt in Bun· v. SheJ'win vVilliam.s Co., 42 
Ca1.2cl G82, G9,)-G9G r 2G8 P .2<1 I 041], refm;rd to extend fltrict 
liability to property damage in the abseuee of privity of con-
tract or an express representation of the manufacturer relied 
upon by the ultimate purc·haser, it has recognized that manu-
facturers are strictly liable to the consumer in cases of food-
stnffs. (Klein v. Ducl1css Sandu•ich Co., Ltd., 14. Cal.2d 272 
[93 P.2d 799].) To date a majority of the court have solved 
the problem of liability for harm caused by defective food 
containers in terms of neglig·ence without considering strict 
liability as an alternative ground of recovery. (Honea v. 
City Dairy, Inc., 22 CaL2d Gl4 [140 P.2d 369] ; Escola v. 
Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal.2d 453 [150 P.2d 436] ; Gordon 
v. Aztec Brcu·ing Co., 33 Cal.2d 514 [203 P.2d 522]; Zentz v. 
Coca Cola Bottling Co., 39 Cal.2d 436 [247 P.2d 344].) What-
ever the arguments for limiting the manufacturer's strict lia-
bility to foodstuffs, there is no rational basis for differentiat-
ing behveen foodstuffs and their containers. (Nichols v. 
Nolcl, 174 Kan. 613 [258 P.2d 317, 323]; Cooper v. Newman, 
11 N.Y.S.2d 319., 320; Haller v. Rudmann, 249 App.Div. 831 
j292 N.Y.S. 58(), 587]; Mcintyre v. J[ansas City Coca Cola 
Bottling Co. (JVIo), 85 .B'ed.Rupp. 708, 711; Mahoney v. 
Shaker Square Bel'cmucs, Ohio C:. P., 102 N.E.2d 281, 289; 
Oeddling v. Marsh. jl920] 1 K.B. GGS, G72-673; ~~lorelli v. 
Pitch and Gibhons. rJ928] 2 K.R. G:J6, G42-644; sec Prosser, 
Torts, [2d rd.j § 84, p. GOD.) It would elarify the law tore-
pudiate that differrntiation OJwnly rathrr than to eircumvent 
it covertly and haphaila rdl,\· hy lea viug juries free to impose 
strict liability if ilH>y so choose, under the guise of res ipsa 
loquitur. (See roneurring opinion in Gordon v. Aztec Brew-
'ing Co., 33 Ca1.2d 514, G:J2 [203 P.2d 522], Hlld cases eited.) 
There is no evidence that the bottle was defective when 
it was delivered to Arden Farms by Owens-Illinois. Since 
it withstood usage by Arden Farms and its customers for 
many months, the only reasonable inference is that it was 
not defective when Owens-Illinois delivered it to Arden 
Parms. 'l'he nonsuit in favor of Owens-Illinois was therefore 
proper under any theory of liability. I would tlwrefore affirm 
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the as to defendant Owens-Illinois and reverse it as 
to def<:ndant Ardrn Farms. 
CHBSON, C .• T., Coneurring- and Dissenting-.--It is clear 
that, as to Owens, the :i udgment of nonsuit should be affirmed. 
The stipulated that plaintiff had no cause of action 
against Owens for bn;aeh of warranty, and she failed to make 
a prima facie ease this defendant based on neg-ligence. 
A1t1JOngh there is substantial +'vich:m·e that the breaking of the 
bottle resulted from a defeet in it, there is no evidence from 
which it can br inferred that this defeet was present when 
the bottle was cldiverc(l b.\- Owens to ~\.rden, who thereafter 
used it for several months before it broke. 
\Vith respect to Arden, however, I am of the virw that the 
judg·ment of nonsuit should be rt'versecl, because the evidence 
is not insufficient as a matter of law to sustain plaintiff's 
cause of action for brea(~h of 'varranty. As shown by the 
discussion in the concurring and dissenting opinions of Jus-
tices Carter and Traynor, there is testimony from whieh the 
,iury could reasonably infer that the bottle was not improperly 
handled in plaintiff's home and that when the bottle was 
delivered by Arden it contained a dcfrct which caused it to 
break If an inf<'rPJWe to that effret wrre drawn by the 
jury, the drfeet in the bottle would constitute a breach of 
warranty by Arden under section 1735 of the Civil Code 
(Uniform Sales Act, § 15), whieh reads in part: ''Subject 
to the provisions of this act and of any statute in that behalf, 
there is no implied warranty or condition as to the nuality 
or fitness for any particular purpose of goo(ls supplied under 
a contract to sell or a sale, except as follo11'S: ( 1) \Vhere the 
buyer, expressly or by implication, makes known to the seller 
the particular purpose for ·which the goods are required, and 
it appears that the buyer rcl ies on the seller's skill or judg-
ment (whether he be the grower or manufacturrr or not), 
there is an implied ·warranty that the goods shall be reason-
ably fit for such purpose. (2) Where the goods are bought 
by description from a seller who deals in goods of that de-
scription (whether he be the grower or manufaeturrr or not), 
thrre is an impliPd warranty that the goods shall be of mer-
chantable quality." (Italics added.) 
Seetion 1735 does not refer merely to goods sold hut to all 
"goods supplied under a contraet to sell or a sale." It has 
been held that when bottled hevrrages are sold, the bottles 
in which they necessarily must be delivered are snpplied 
under the contract of sale within the meaning of the statute 
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although the bottles are bailed rather than sold. v. 
-Marsh (1920), 1 K.B. 668; see 1 Williston on Sales (rev. 
ed. 1948), 582, n. 1.) The Geddling case related to a sale of 
"lime juice and soda" in bailed bottles and was decided under 
section 14 of the English Sale of Goods Act, 1893, which 
contains provisions identical 1vith those above 
from section 17:35. The findings in that case showed that the 
sale came within the first subdivision of the but the 
reasoning of the court is equally applicable to a sale coming 
within the second subdivision. Accordingly, even if we 
assume that the bottle involved here was hailed, it would be 
subject to any warranty which would be applicable under 
either of the quoted subdivisions if the bottle had been sold. 
The sale of a bottle of milk by a dairy under the circum-
stances appearing here elearly comes within the language of 
the seeond subdivision of the statute, and the seller's implied 
warranty of merehantable quality under this provision in-
cludes a warranty that his product is reasonably fit for the 
general purpose for which goods of that kind are sold. (See 
Simrnons v. Rhodes & ,Jamieson, Ltcl., 46 Cal.2d 190, 194 [293 
P.2d 26] ; Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., 42 Cal.2d 682, 694 
[268 P.2d 1041).) It is obvious that a milk bottle which is so 
defective that it will break under normal handling is not 
fit for the ordinary use for which it was intended and that 
the delivery of such a defective bottle constitutes a breach of 
warranty. 
The buyer may recover for breach of the statutory warranty 
without proving negligence on the part of the seller. ( Trem-
eroli v. Austin Trailer Equip. Co., 102 Cal.App.2d 464, 475 
[227 P.2d 923]; Vaccarezza v. Sangm:netti, 71 Cal.App.2d 687, 
689 [163 P.2d 470]; 1 Williston on Sales (rev. ed. 1948), 
617.) Accordingly, it is not necessary to consider in this 
dissent whether the evidence is sufficient to support a judg-
ment upon the theory that Arden was nrgligent. Likewise 
it is not necessary to discuss whether our decision in II onea v. 
City Dairy, Inc., 22 Cal.2d 614 [140 P.2d 369], precludes 
resort to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur under the evidence 
presented here. 
I would affirm the judgment with respect to Owens and 
reverse it with respect to Arden. 
Appellant's petition for a rehraring was denied May 21, 
1958. Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., and Traynor, J., were of the 
opinion that the petition should be granted. 
